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“Our world has become increasingly smaller. As a result, entertainment product – our 
product – is going to be worldwide. You can’t be parochial any more. It can’t just be 
about the United States” MLB President Bob DuPuy (King, 2006, page 1). 
 
 When Japan defeated Cuba 10-6 in finals of the inaugural World Baseball Classic 
(WBC), it not only completed a competitive baseball tournament, but it also ushered in a 
new era of globalization for Major League Baseball (MLB). The WBC was created to 
increase worldwide baseball participation, and more importantly, consumption of 
baseball and baseball-related products. The tournament was designed to mirror soccer’s 
World Cup – with one major structural difference. While the World Cup is governed by 
an independent agency called the International Federation of Association Football 
(FIFA), the World Baseball Classic is administered by Major League Baseball and the 
Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) (Schwarz, 2005). In addition, 
while soccer is extensively played in almost every nation on earth, baseball, though 
firmly established in some countries, has only recently been introduced in many others, 
and in some countries remains relatively unknown (Foer, 2004; Szymanski & Zimbalist, 
2005).   
The effort by MLB to expand into untapped international markets mimics the 
actions of other sport and non-sport organizations as globalization has been a prominent 
topic in the recent academic and practitioner literature (Friedman, 2000; Friedman, 2005). 
The global world permits a greater flow of information as well as an easier exchange of 
human and financial capital. However, operating in diverse markets is not without 
challenges. Cultural barriers and customs can negatively affect production, while 
different levels of government intervention may impact operations. Despite these 
obstacles, the sports industry has noticed global trends and has begun to attract 
employees from various continents and to develop new markets and delivery channels 
(Foster, Greyser, & Walsh, 2006).  
Designing and implementing the first WBC required MLB to extensively interact 
within this changing global market place. This chapter details some of obstacles 
encountered during the creation and development of the WBC. It begins with a brief 
history of international baseball and then explores some of the economic, political, 
marketing, and legal factors regarding the first World Baseball Classic. It concludes with 
a discussion of future World Baseball Classics as well as the impact of other MLB 
globalization initiatives.   
Baseball’s Worldwide Development 
Though the sport of baseball has long been considered the American national 
pastime (Guevara & Fidler, 2002) it has enjoyed mixed success when introduced in 
foreign countries. In 1889, Albert Spalding organized a baseball tour to Hawaii and 
Australia (Szymanski & Zimbalist, 2005). While in Australia, he decided to continue the 
tour back to the United States via Egypt and Europe. Though the tour generated some 
curious observers, for the most part the sport did not become popular. However, 
American Horace Wilson, a history teacher working in Tokyo, had introduced baseball to 
Japan in 1873 with much greater success (Whiting, 1990). Shortly after its introduction, 
the game grew throughout the country. In 1908 the first of many American baseball tours 
brought major and minor league stars to Japan for an extended visit (Whiting, 2004). 
Later visits by star players such as Lou Gehrig and Lefty O’Doul enhanced interest in the 
sport. In 1934, Babe Ruth led a contingent of prominent American players who toured 
Japan and sparked an interest in potentially creating a professional league (Rains, 2001).  
Although the exact beginnings of baseball in Cuba is unknown (Echevarria, 
1999), it was likely introduced in the 1860s (“Baseball in Latin America,” n. d.). It 
quickly grew in popularity and eventually emerged as the sport of choice for Cubans 
seeking a national identity and independence from colonial ruler Spain (Echevarria). In 
1880, brothers Ignacio and Ubaldo Alorma emigrated from Cuba to the Dominican 
Republic and brought baseball to the island where it quickly proliferated (Klein, 2006). 
From its roots in Cuba and the Dominican Republic, the game of baseball rapidly spread 
throughout the Caribbean and into South American countries such as Venezuela. 
 The growth of baseball’s popularity resulted in the formation of professional 
teams and leagues. In 1869, the Cincinnati Reds became the first professional baseball 
team in the world (“Cincinnati Reds,” n. d.). In 1876 the National League was established 
as the highest caliber baseball league in the world – both in on-field talent and financial 
backing. Baseball’s popularity was so prevalent throughout the United States that most 
cities of significant size had semi-professional or professional teams (Seymour, 1971).  
The sport of baseball was clearly America’s game of choice – both for participation and 
consumption. Among the rival leagues to emerge in the late 19th and early 20th century, 
the American League, established in 1901, was by far the most successful. The two 
leagues formed Major League Baseball and participated in the first World Series in 1903. 
Major League Baseball has since reshaped and organized many of the minor professional 
leagues in the United States (Miller, 1990; Seymour).  
The creation of Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB) in 1936 rapidly increased the 
sports’ popularity in Japan (Rains, 2001). The NPB has clearly established itself as the 
second best professional baseball league in the world, with a rich tradition, successful 
players, and substantial financial support from the league’s owners (Whiting, 2004). 
Numerous American players have played in the NPB since soon after its inception 
(Whiting). However, despite Masanori Murakami playing for the San Francisco Giants in 
1964, it was not until the last 10 years that considerable numbers of Japanese players  
signed contracts to play in the MLB (Edes, 2007). It is likely that many more Japanese 
players will come to America in the next decade (Edes).   
Other countries, though less well-known than the NPB in the United States, have 
established professional and semi-professional leagues. The Mexican League is perhaps 
best known for producing pitching sensation Fernando Valenzuela, but it also has a long, 
rich tradition. Though not in the American spotlight, other countries such as the 
Dominican Republic, Cuba, South Korea, and Taiwan also developed professional 
leagues soon after the sport began to be played in those areas. Each of these countries’ 
leagues has had various levels of success (Klein, 2006). Although baseball has only 
recently been introduced in the Netherlands, Italy, and South Africa, amateur and semi-
professional leagues have recently been established (Klein).i  
The Consumption of MLB in the United States 
Major League Baseball’s popularity grew rapidly after the first World Series in 
1903. Although the 1919 Chicago “Black Sox” scandal caused concerns, the sport 
rebounded and increased its influence – primarily because of the emergence of Babe 
Ruth. Later stars such as Joe DiMaggio, Ted Williams, and Stan Musial helped MLB 
dominate the American sports consumption landscape until the late 1950s when the 
National Football League (NFL) and other leagues began to erode its market share. By 
the 1970s, the NFL had surpassed baseball as the most watched American sport and had 
likely passed baseball as the National Pastime (Harris, 1986). However, the sport 
continued to enjoy a strong following despite the growth of competitor sports and other 
entertainment options. Even though recent polls indicate that fewer and fewer people 
identify MLB as their favorite sport, it still remains popular among Americans (Klein, 
2006).   
 Major League Baseball has maintained a strong fan base despite recent crises.  
Numerous labor stoppages have certainly hurt the sport and its popularity, but even the 
cancellation of the 1994 World Series did not completely destroy its popularity (Wetzel, 
2006). Even though there were a few teams that had difficulty retaining many of their 
previous customers after the work stoppage (Foster, Greyser, & Walsh, 2006), as an 
industry, MLB quickly recovered. Though recent steroid scandals have generated 
considerable negative attention and some fan and media backlash, MLB realized record 
attendance numbers in 2004, 2005, and 2006 (Newman, 2007).      
Although labor unrest and steroid scandals have not deterred fans from attending 
and watching MLB games in record numbers, there is potential cause for long-term 
concern among MLB owners. The number of American children playing and watching 
baseball has declined over the past few years (“What are today’s youth…”, 2006). There 
is an overall concern that traditional American consumer sports, such as MLB, are no 
longer holding the attention of the next generation of consumers at the same rate as 
emerging sports such as the X-Games or as well as non-sport activities such as video 
games (“What are today’s youth…”). Major League Baseball (among some other 
leagues) has also scheduled prominent games at times too late in the evening for young 
children to watch, creating the opportunity for emerging sports to attract young 
consumers before they go to bed at night (Deford, 1999). If young fans are not attracted 
to the sport as participants or consumers, the future purchasers of tickets, media, and 
licensed merchandise may spend their dollar elsewhere once they have developed 
disposable income streams.  
The Creation of the World Baseball Classic 
Major League Baseball has certainly been aware of its attendance successes and 
failures as well as the potential issues regarding its current and future fan demographics. 
In addition, MLB has long recognized that the United States and Canada only account for 
roughly 330 million of the 6.5 billion people in the world and that a key component of 
future growth will be exploring opportunities in foreign markets (Guevara & Fidler, 
2002). Prior to contemplating a world baseball tournament, MLB had been implementing 
activities around the globe through MLB International, which was founded in 1989 
(“MLB International,” n. d.). MLB International was designed to generate revenue for 
MLB franchise owners by selling broadcast rights, securing sponsorships, and staging 
events abroad (Guevara & Fidler). MLB International organized MLB exhibition games 
in Cuba in 1999, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela in 2000, and Puerto Rico and 
Mexico in 2001 (Guevara & Fidler). In 1999, MLB opened the regular season in 
Monterrey, Mexico with the Colorado Rockies defeating the San Diego Padres 8-2 
(Biertempfel, 2007). Other regular season games were also played in Tokyo, Japan (2000 
& 2004) with a planned 2003 set of Tokyo games cancelled due to the Iraq War 
(Biertempfel). San Juan, Puerto Rico hosted regular season games in 2001 and then was 
also the part-time home of the Montreal Expos during the 2003-2004 seasons (Guevara & 
Fidler; “Historical moments,” n. d.). It is likely that future exhibition and regular season 
games will be played in different countries – perhaps on an annual basis.    
Insert Sidebar 1 about here 
In addition to playing games, MLB has also implemented international activities 
in a variety of countries. MLB has created an Envoy program that sends coaches to teach 
the game in emerging baseball countries (“Development initiatives,” n. d.). In 1991, the 
first set of coaches went to Holland and since then instruction has been delivered in over 
60 countries. MLB has also developed the Pitch, Hit, and Run (PHR) curriculum to be 
administered in physical education classes in developing countries around the world 
(“Development initiatives”). Over 3 million students in countries such as Australia, 
Germany, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Puerto Rico, South Africa and the United Kingdom have 
learned the intricacies of the game through the PHR program. In addition, MLB also 
sponsors baseball festivals and supports baseball academies.  
Guevara and Fidler (2002) have noted that MLB international initiatives serve 
different purposes in various countries. Since MLB has analyzed every country and rated 
it based upon its recognition and understanding of the game, participation development, 
and ability to consume baseball and baseball-related products (Klein, 2006), MLB will 
seek different goals in specific areas. In some countries, such as most of those in Europe, 
baseball is not a popular participation sport, let alone one that customers would likely 
immediately consume. However, most citizens of the European countries have some 
potential disposable income to purchase MLB-related products, which could occur in the 
future if the sport can increase its popularity. In countries throughout Latin America and 
parts of South America, playing and watching baseball are popular pastimes, but limited 
financial resources for most potential consumers constricts MLB’s ability to sell 
extension products (licensed merchandise, media rights, etc). In Japan and Korea, 
baseball is popular, but MLB faces challenges to sell its products because both countries 
have extensive professional leagues as well as baseball cultures already established 
(King, 2006). Perhaps MLB’s greatest but most difficult marketing opportunity is in 
China. Unfortunately, not only is there limited understanding of baseball, there are also 
generations who deny the existence of the game as a suitable pastime since Mao Zedong 
had once declared it illegal (Posner, 2006).  
Despite the challenges unique to international markets, by 2004 MLB desired to 
expand its global presence by attempting to build a baseball tournament that would bring 
the top world competitors together much as the Olympics and World Cup do every four 
years. MLB hoped that it could overcome political, social, and cultural barriers and begin 
to build an event that would not only generate short-term revenues during a two-week 
tournament, but would also create profits throughout the year from other critical sport 
revenue streams such as the sale of sponsorships, media rights, and licensed merchandise. 
MLB initially planned to stage the first World Baseball Classic in 2005, but officials 
from Japanese baseball would not commit to a format where the control of the 
tournament and the majority of the profits would be retained by Major League Baseball 
(Szymanski & Zimbalist, 2005).  
Eventually, MLB and the MLBPA decided to each take 25% of the potential 
profits from the tournament, with the other 50% of the profits divided among the 
participating teams – with 50% of each participating countries’ share required to be given 
to the country’s baseball governing body to grow the game (Fisher, 2006a). Japanese 
officials agreed to the established financial and structural terms and in 2005 the World 
Baseball Classic was tentatively scheduled to be played in March 2006 (Schwarz, 2005). 
Immediately upon announcing the March 2006 WBC schedule, critics began to 
note potential areas of concern. Sixteen countries representing the greatest baseball 
playing nations in the world were selected to compete (Table 1). Although MLB and the 
MLBPA had established guidelines regarding participation as well as injury prevention 
rules such as strict pitch counts (“World Baseball Classic FAQ,” 2006), pundits 
immediately noted that many of the best players in the world would not participate since 
the games would be played during MLB spring trainingii (McGrath, 2006). In addition, 
the WBC would be played during the same year as the Winter Olympic Games and the 
World Cup, two international events that could potentially take some fan and media 
attention from the tournament. Despite these concerns, MLB enthusiastically 
implemented the plan to stage an international baseball tournament in the global 
marketplace.        
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 Despite some initial objections regarding the hosting of the various rounds,  
preliminary games were scheduled in Japan (Pool A - China, Chinese Taipai, Japan, & 
South Korea), Puerto Rico (Pool C - Cuba, Panama, Puerto Rico, & The Netherlands), 
and the United States (Pool B – Canada, Mexico, South Africa, & United States; Pool D 
– Australia, Dominican Republic, Italy, & Venezuela). In order to permit Asian teams to 
have time to recuperate from travel, Pool A games were completed five days prior to the 
completion of the other pools. To save additional time and costs, second round games 
were played in Puerto Rico and the United States during the second week of March, and 
the final round was also played in the United States during the third week of March. The 
schedule enabled players from Asian professional leagues ample time to travel back 
across the Pacific Ocean after the WBC was completed. In addition, the contesting of the 
second round and final round games in North America enabled MLB players to return to 
their professional team almost immediately after their country was eliminated from 
competition.    
Globalization: Political Problems  
Despite extensive planning for logistics and attention to detail, political 
considerations nearly detracted from the World Baseball Classic months before the first 
pitch. Globalization has certainly made the world smaller and made people more aware of 
the cultural differences among various nations, but it has not necessarily addressed all 
previous disputes. For over 40 years, the United States has considered Cuba to be a rogue 
nation and has extended an economic embargo upon Fidel Castro’s island nation 
(Edelman, 2005). Although American citizens are not forbidden to travel to Cuba, direct 
commercial flights are not available. In addition, Americans are prohibited from making 
direct investments on the island. Despite the creation of the WBC and the announcement 
of the playing schedule, on December 13, 2005, the United States Treasury Department 
denied a request by MLB for a waiver for the Cuban National Team to participate in 
games on U.S. soil (Edelman). The refusal to grant the waiver placed MLB and Cuba in a 
precarious position. If Cuba were to advance past the second round, it would have to 
forfeit its position in the final round – creating a potentially chaotic situation.   
 The WBC was not the first attempt by MLB to involve Cuba in an international 
baseball competition. In 1999 the Baltimore Orioles petitioned and received an 
exemption from the embargo to play a not-for-profit home-and-home series against the 
Cuban National team with the proceeds going to Hurricane Mitch victims (“Political 
hardball,” 1999). The two-game series elicited considerable criticism due to Castro’s 
notorious human rights violations (Blum, 2005). MLB umpire Rich Garcia expressed the 
thoughts of many when he noted, “My God, you can't bring a Cuban cigar across the U.S. 
border yet we're going to take a baseball team over there and try to be nice to this man” 
(“Political hardball,” para 10). However, despite the uproar regarding the Orioles’ games, 
the U.S. government permitted the series, as it had previously allowed Cuba to compete 
in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics (Blum).   
As the deliberations regarding Cuba’s participation in the WBC continued, some 
critics noted that the United States could be jeopardizing its opportunity to host future 
international sporting events – including the Olympic Games (Blum, 2005). Hoping to 
avoid an embarrassing situation where one of the top baseball teams was absent, MLB 
petitioned the Treasury department for a WBC exemption while at the same time it 
exerted political pressure through a variety of channels. After over a month of 
negotiations, on January 23, 2006 the U.S. government issued a special license for Cuba 
to participate (“Treasury Department allows…,” 2006). As part of the license, Cuba 
agreed to forgo any financial gain from the tournament by donating any profits it received 
to victims of Hurricane Katrina (“Treasury Department allows…,”).iii  
World Baseball Classic Revenue Sources 
 The organizers of any sporting event ultimately will judge their level of success 
by achieving financial objectives. Major League Baseball envisioned that the WBC 
would generate income through traditional revenue sources such as ticketing, media, 
sponsorships, and licensed merchandise. These revenue streams could be evaluated as 
soon as the tournament was completed. In addition, MLB hoped that the WBC would 
instigate short and long-term increases in consumption patterns for all MLB related 
products and services. Measuring success in these areas is certainly more difficult, but 
could initially be evaluated by the reaction and attitudes of fans and by the desire of 
participants and participating teams to compete in future Classics. 
Revenue Sources: Ticketing  
After resolving the dispute regarding Cuba’s participation, the greatest concern 
for the WBC was potential live attendance. During the first games held in Japan, it 
appeared that on-site attendance would fall woefully short of the 800,000 tournament 
projections (Fisher, 2006b). For the three opening games in Japan that did not involve the 
home team (South Korea, China, Taiwan), total attendance was only 13,695 (Fisher). The 
situation in Japan convinced many observers that few customers at any site would bother 
to attend games if the home team was not playing (McGrath, 2006). However, once 
games began in Puerto Rico and the United States, attendance increased, particularly in 
the United States. For the entire tournament 737,112 customers attended, with the final in 
San Diego between Japan and Cuba drawing 42,696 (Fisher).  
One of the reasons that games in the United States were able to attract fans for 
non-U.S. competitions was because many recent immigrants of Hispanic decent attended 
games played by their home country. In addition, many fans traveled to the United States 
with the intent to include attendance at WBC games as part of their vacations. The initial 
critics of WBC attendance did not recognize that Japan and the United States have vastly 
different demographics. The Hispanic population in the United States is growing rapidly 
and 25% of all Hispanics in the United States attended at least one MLB game in 2004, 
more than attended professional soccer games (Eros, 2005). The 41.4 million Hispanics 
living in the U.S. actually have demonstrated a passion for “American” sports which has 
resulted in higher consumption rates for major professional sports like football than 
Caucasians and African-Americans (Eros). The Hispanic enthusiasm for the WBC was 
noted by Bill Pearce, Chief Marketing Director at Taco Bell, “For that event to have that 
much credibility out of the gate for the first time was truly amazing” (Mickle, 2006, pg. 
5). For most games in Puerto Rico and the United States, there was definitely a high level 
of energy and excitement (Fisher, 2006a). This enthusiasm bolstered MLB hopes for 
future tournaments and additional global marketing and revenue generating initiatives.  
Revenue Sources: Media Coverage 
 Though the success of any live sporting event is initially judged by in-person 
attendance, media attention indicates the potential for short and long-term growth. In the 
case of a worldwide event like the WBC, television ratings may be even more important 
than on-site attendance as many potential viewers may not have the ability to travel to see 
a game in person. In the United States, the 12 WBC telecasts on ESPN had a 1.1 rating 
(1,205,600 households)iv, while the 20 telecasts on ESPN2 had a .6 rating (657,600 
households) (Fisher, 2006a). Of particular interest for the future growth of the WBC in 
the United States was the 1.8 rating (1,972,800 households) for the WBC final as the 
American team had been eliminated in the second round. Though the U.S. ratings were 
not spectacular compared to playoff or World Series games, they greatly exceeded 
anticipated projections. When considering the American’s on-field performance and the 
fact that the WBC was scheduled during the heart of the NCAA March Basketball 
Tournaments, the ratings and overall interest bodes well for the future of the Tournament.  
In addition to the solid television viewership figures in the United States, the 
semifinal game between South Korea and Japan garnered strong ratings in Japan, despite 
being shown at a less than desirable time of the day (Bloom, 2006). The Japanese victory 
over Cuba in the finals also attracted strong ratings. Certainly, Japanese fans were 
primarily focused upon “their” team, but such strong ratings for an event played in the 
middle of the night in Japan signals the long-term interest in continuing the event. Paul 
Archey, MLB Vice President for International Business Operations, noted MLB’s 
reaction to the television ratings, “It’s important, and I don’t want to diminish its 
importance. ESPN is very happy with how they’ve done, and so are we, but it’s foremost 
about growing the game globally, and we can’t lose sight of that” (Fisher, 2006a, pg 1). 
 The strong media numbers generated by the WBC continued an overall increased 
worldwide ratings trend for MLB. In 1990, MLB generated $10 million total from all 
revenue sources outside North America, while in 2005, MLB generated $120 million 
(King, 2006). ESPN recently launched a version of ESPN Classic in Europe which now 
reaches 8 million homes in Great Britain and an additional 8 million homes on the 
European continent (Bernstein, 2006). ESPN’s European presence likely helped to double 
MLB’s European rights fees to $20 million over five years (Bernstein). Interestingly, 
ESPN was outbid for those rights by Ireland based North American Sports Network 
(NASN), a company that initially was formed to service expatriated North Americans. 
However, NASN recently discovered that 70% of their subscribers were native Britons 
(Bernstein)!  
Although television is currently the dominant media forum, in 2000, MLB 
established a subsidiary, Major League Baseball Advanced Media (MLBAM), to extend 
the presence of MLB operations across the rapidly growing Internet (Brown, 2005). 
Within two years of its creation, MLBAM began to generate a profit, and revenues and 
profits continue to rapidly increase (Moag & Company, 2006). MLBAM has not only 
advanced baseball related content, but it has also positioned MLB as an investor in the 
global sports environment. MLBAM recently purchased a 10% stake in World 
Championship Sports Network (WCSN) which broadcasts sports such as track and field, 
rowing, and wrestling (Brown). In addition, MLBAM has begun to sign agreements with 
numerous international companies to license baseball related content for games in 
countries such as Japan and South Korea (“MLB Advanced Media and Reakosys…,” 
2006; “MLB Advanced Media and Tasuke…,” 2006). A significant component of 
MLB’s continued foray into international markets involves MLBAM delivering baseball 
related content in combination with MLB staging a world tournament.    
Revenue Sources: Sponsorship 
 The development of on-site customers and media consumers was certainly only 
part of MLB’s revenue plan for the WBC. Major League Baseball also hoped to attract 
numerous international corporations as sponsors of the World Baseball Classic. Soon 
after the WBC was scheduled, Mastercard signed on as a sponsor. Tom Murphy, Vice 
President of Sponsorships for Mastercard noted his company’s interest in the potential of 
the WBC, “The Classic is a great way to extend our established ties to baseball, and its 
one of the very few global sports properties” (Lefton, 2006, pg. 3). In addition to 
Mastercard, Konami participated as the other WBC global sponsor (“Sponsorship roster 
announced…”, 2006). In total, 26 companies sponsored the WBC at the national or 
regional level. Among the American companies were Anheuser-Busch, Gatorade, and 
MBNA (“Sponsorship roster announced…”). In addition, other companies such as Taco 
Bell who were not official sponsors bought considerable advertisement time on ESPN 
and ESPN Deportes in an effort to target emerging demographics in the global 
marketplace (Lefton). Though there were only two global sponsors for the initial WBC, 
MLB hopes to significantly increase that number for future tournaments. Other national 
and regional sponsors will also be solicited.  
 In addition to its activities centered upon the WBC, MLB has diligently been 
building its other sponsorship relationships outside of North America. Since it opened a 
permanent office in Asia, MLB has been able to have 60% of its sponsorships be 
multiyear agreements in that area, when recently it was only 20% (King, 2006). In Latin 
America, despite the limited disposable income of most potential consumers, total 
sponsorship dollars has increased 140% to $3 million a year over the last two years 
(King). MLB overseas offices are an indication that they understand the value - both 
financial and symbolic - a daily presence in the marketplace provides for future 
marketing penetration.  
The growth of MLB’s international sponsorship sales has, at times, encountered 
unique challenges. Historically, teams and leagues in the United States have discouraged 
or prohibited sponsor logos on uniforms, but have typically displayed logos throughout 
sport facilities. However, in professional sports leagues in Asia and Europe, uniform 
sponsorships are a common practice (Lefton, 2006). MLB has learned that sponsorships 
need to be tailored to the unique aspects of each potential country rather than to an area 
of the world. MLB Vice President of International Marketing and Development Jim 
Small noted, “The thing we’ve learned is that you can’t just say were going to do 
something across a region. Strategies have to be customized, country by country (King, 
2006, para 16). Paul Archey echoed Small’s comments when he specifically discussed 
MLB’s Asian sponsorship initiatives. 
  
Japan and Korea are as different as two cultures can get, they just happen to be in 
close proximity. But they speak different languages and they have different 
cultures and food. Certainly we shouldn’t expect to be able to put the same 
strategy in Japan and take it to Korea or China and have it work just because it’s 
Asia. (Fisher, 2006b, pg. 62) 
 
MLB has also had to educate some of its overseas sponsors regarding the 
combination of marketing activities beyond the simple sponsorship investment (“WBC 
silences its critics,” 2006). While American based companies such as Mastercard have 
been focused on sponsorship activation for years, companies overseas have often not 
moved beyond sponsorship simply being signage or an isolated advertisement. Jim Small 
commented on this sponsorship aspect,  
 
They want to pay you for the marks and run an ad and that’s it.  If they decide 
they want to run another ad next year, they do another deal. What we’re trying to 
do is get them to realize that it’s not just an advertising vehicle, but also a sales 
tool. We’re trying to change the way sports marketing is conducted here. It’s 
difficult, but we’re making progress. (King, 2006, para 39) 
  
 The development of viable sponsorships will certainly be a vital component of 
MLB’s globalization activities. As more American-based businesses expand their 
operations away from North America, MLB hopes to become a viable marketing outlet 
for those companies to reach potential customers. In addition, companies in foreign 
countries can utilize MLB related events and content to grow their business. Ultimately, 
the sale of sponsorships will be driven by in-person attendance and media consumption 
of the WBC and other MLB events.   
Revenue Sources: Licensed Merchandise 
 Perhaps the most important area of revenue growth for MLB and the WBC is the 
sale of licensed merchandise – particularly sales beyond the traditional American and 
Canadian landscape. Though MLB trails the NFL in licensed merchandise sales 
(Weisman, 2004), MLB still experienced over $3.5 billion in total sales of licensed 
merchandise in 2005 (Horrow, 2005). Since more people throughout the world play and 
watch baseball than American football, MLB feels that there are tremendous growth 
opportunities in different worldwide markets.  
Certainly, MLB viewed licensed merchandise sales as a key component of the 
WBC. The sale of licensed merchandise in Mexico and throughout Latin America was 
brisk during the Tournament, with vendors often running out of product before games 
were finished. Paul Archey was asked to assess the television ratings and the sale of 
licensed products south of the U.S. border. “Our business partners in Mexico…think this 
may be the biggest thing to happen for baseball down there since Fernando (Valenzuela)” 
(King, 2006, para 45). Despite the U.S. team not making the WBC finals, merchandise 
sales at the championship game in San Diego generated a $10 per cap (average sales per 
attendee) for the 42,696 attendees, which compares favorably to a typical World Series 
game (Fisher, 2006a). For a regular season San Diego Padres’ game, the licensed 
merchandise per cap was $2 during the 2006 season (Fisher). 
 The tremendous sales during WBC games certainly signal a potential area of 
revenue growth, but there are potential challenges to conducting business in foreign 
markets. Many countries, particularly those in Asia as well as Central and South 
America, do not have the same strict intellectual property protections that businesses in 
the United States enjoy. On a recent trip to Venezuela, Longley and McKelvey (2006) 
noted the vast number of counterfeiters who were, without apparent recourse, brazenly 
selling pirated merchandise outside a baseball stadium. Even in countries where 
trademarks are protected, consumers prefer different methods of purchasing merchandise. 
For instance, in South Korea there are over 50 “team” stores which account for the 
majority of sales of all licensed sports merchandise. However, in Japan there are few 
team stores, and licensees simply produce and distribute merchandise through a myriad 
of different channels such as traditional department stores (King, 2006). If MLB hopes to 
maximize revenues from the vast numbers of potential consumers around the world, they 
likely will need to study the unique marketing and legal aspects of the different areas of 
the global marketplace.  
 
The Future of Major League Baseball and the World Baseball Classic 
Despite initial concerns regarding participants, logistics, and attendance, the 
World Baseball Classic was a financial success – particularly since interest remained high 
despite the United State’s team elimination prior to the finals. Prior to the start of the 
championship game between Cuba and Japan, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig noted, 
“Anything you do for the first time is not going to be perfect. But by any stretch of the 
imagination, this tournament exceeded my expectations in a myriad of ways” (Bloom, 
2006, para 2). After initially worrying that the event might lose money, a $10 million 
profit was realized, even though attendance fell short of the 800,000 projection (Fisher, 
2006a). MLB and the MLB Players Association were certainly pleased to split $5 
million, and the remaining money distributed to the participating countries increased the 
likelihood that the next tournament would be expanded to include more countries and 
potentially additional preliminary rounds.  
Rather than play in 2010, MLB has decided to stage the next World Baseball 
Classic in 2009 with succeeding tournaments then being contested every four years 
thereafter. Scheduling the tournament in 2009 will avoid any competition for the world’s 
attention from the Olympics or World Cup. The Olympic Games recently announced that 
2012 is the last time that baseball will be contested (Goldman, 2005) – leaving MLB in a 
position to develop the sport and prosper from its future growth. The World Baseball 
Classic succeeded by attracting MLB caliber players, something the Olympics was 
unable to accomplish since its reintroduction as a medal sport in 1992.  
Despite its initial success, one major hurdle the World Baseball Classic will need 
to overcome to become a truly worldwide event is the staging of later rounds outside the 
United States. Certainly, numerous countries have the baseball infrastructure to support a 
tournament, but concerns exist that other countries would not attract significant in-game 
attendance if the host nation was eliminated from competition. Japan has discussed its 
desire to host the 2009 semifinals and finals, but given attendance at the 2006 WBC it is 
unlikely to be able to support those games unless Japan is playing. “Japan has to establish 
they can draw a non-Japanese audience” noted MLBPA chief operating officer Gene 
Orza when asked about moving the later rounds from the United States (Fisher, 2006b, pg 
62). Even though the United States is likely to host the later rounds in the 2009 
tournament, by 2013 or 2017 the globalization of baseball through the WBC might create 
a worldwide event that could be supported by multiple countries regardless of the 
participating teams. However, until that time it will likely only be the U.S., with its large 
population and multiple demographic groups, that can be assured of having significant 
numbers of fans attending games if the American team is not participating. Future 
tournament games held outside the United States may spur new young participants to 
embrace the sport. Ultimately, MLB would love to see a new generation of fans in 
Europe or a “Yao Ming” of baseball from China who could galvanize the most populous 
nation on earth.    
In addition to generating initial profits, the WBC has positioned MLB to be the 
leader in growing the game of baseball and the commercial aspects of the sport 
throughout the world. As baseball grows, and more importantly as the American brand of 
baseball grows, it will be interesting to watch the worldwide reaction – particularly if 
MLB begins to generate huge profits overseas. Other prominent American brands such as 
Coke, Nike, Disney, and McDonalds have been both embraced and scorned as they have 
ventured beyond the fifty U.S. states. MLB will have unique challenges, but also 
tremendous opportunities as they attempt to expand their potential marketplace from 330 
million consumers to the entire world. Ultimately, the long-term impact of the initial 
World Baseball Classic will not be known for many years, but it appears that the initial 
tournament met, and in some cases, exceeded expectations. 
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Side Bar 1- Other Leagues 
Major League Baseball is not the only North American professional sports’ 
league attempting to expand into international markets. The National Basketball 
Association (NBA), National Football League (NFL) and National Hockey League 
(NHL) have already implemented globalization initiatives and have focused their efforts 
toward future endeavors. In 1990, the NBA became the first major North American 
professional sports league to play outside of North America as the Utah Jazz played two 
games against the Phoenix Suns in Japan (“NBA international historic timeline,” n. d.). 
NBA Commissioner David Stern has long professed his desire to eventually have teams 
based in Europe. The NBA recently opened a permanent office in London, England, 
which may signal that expansion is likely to occur in the next 10 years (“NBA announces 
opening…,” 2007). The NHL, based in Canada and the United States, has been 
successful in attracting players from numerous European countries since the early 1980s 
(Lapointe, 1992). In 2007, the Anaheim Ducks and Los Angeles Kings will play the first 
games outside of North American when the teams meet for two games in London, 
England (“London calling,” 2007).  
Perhaps the most interesting North American professional sports international 
development has involved the NFL. Although it is the dominant American consumer 
sport, American football has not generated nearly as strong an international audience 
primarily because the sport is not played extensively in most countries. The NFL has 
played preseason games in foreign countries since 1986, and in 2005 the San Francisco 
Forty-Niners and Arizona Cardinals played a regular season game in Mexico City in front 
of over 100,000 spectators (Wilner, 2006). NFL Europa (previously called the World 
League of American Football and NFL Europe) was established in 1991 (“Turning the 
dream into reality,” n. d.), but a fan base sufficient to support the league never developed. 
NFL owners voted to close NFL Europa in 2007 (“NFL Europa closes,” n. d.). However, 
despite the vote to cease NFL Europa operations, the NFL later announced that up to two 
NFL regular season games a year would begin to be played in foreign countries (“NFL to 
play…,” 2006). Mexico, Canada, Britain, and Germany were among the countries likely 
to be included in the rotation. The first overseas regular season game was played in 
London between the New York Giants and Miami Dolphins.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Countries Participating in the 2006 World Baseball Classic 
 
Australia   Netherlands 
Canada    Panama 
China    Puerto Rico**     
Cuba    South Africa 
Dominican Republic  South Korea 
Italy    Taiwan 
Japan*    United States*** 
Mexico   Venezuela 
 
* Host 1st Round Games 
** Hosted 1st and 2nd Round games 
*** Hosted 1st and 2nd Round games as well as semifinals and finals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
End Notes – Further Readings 
The globalization of baseball and other sports has become a prominent topic in 
academic and practitioner literature. Thomas Friedman’s writings for the New York Times 
and his books cited in this chapter certainly provide a solid understanding of global forces 
impacting all businesses throughout the world. Robert Whiting’s seminal work covering 
the business of Japanese baseball must be read to fully understand the political, cultural 
and social forces at work in Japan. In addition to writing Growing the Game, Alan Klein 
has also detailed baseball in Latin America in Sugarball: The American Game, the 
Dominican Dream and Baseball on the Border: A Tale of Two Laredos. George Gmelch 
has edited a book, Baseball without Borders, that details the sports’ growth and current 
status in North and South America, Europe, Australia, and Asia.    
 
  
                                                 
i The operation of various amateur and professional baseball leagues throughout the world has created an 
interesting system for procuring playing talent for MLB teams. Though sometimes highly critical of the 
process of MLB player acquisition in Latin America, Guevara and Fidler’s book Stealing Lives thoroughly 
details all the different mechanism by which players from throughout the various areas of the world may be 
signed to MLB contracts.  
 
ii Despite concerns from managers and owners such as the New York Yankees’ George Steinbrenner, 
significant injuries were nearly completely avoided. One player who was unfortunately lost for the 2006 
MLB season was Mexican pitcher Luis Ayala of the Washington Nationals.  
 
iii Interestingly, after the tournament Cuban Manager Higinio Velez noted that Cuba had such a positive 
experience that they would like to bid to host games in the 2009 WBC (Rojas, 2006). Although the U.S. 
government has somewhat scaled back their overall Cuban embargo, it is unlikely MLB would pursue 
Cuba as a potential host. Certainly, currying the disapproval of the U.S. government is always present, but 
a stronger consideration (maybe the only consideration?) for avoiding games in Havana is the limited 
disposable income most Cubans have to potentially purchase licensed merchandise and other MLB related 
products.  
 
iv Rating represents the number of households watching a television program, while share measures the 
percentage of televisions that are on that are watching the selected show. Each rating point is roughly 1% of 
the total 109,600,000 households in the United States (Neilson Media Research, n. d.). 
 
